chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Task Force.

- (c) Coordinated Plan.
- (1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall develop a coordinated plan to-
- (A) reduce the proliferation and impact of digital content forgeries, including by exploring how the adoption of a digital content provenance standard could assist with reducing the proliferation of digital content forgeries:
- (B) develop mechanisms for content creators to-
- (i) cryptographically certify the authenticity of original media and non-deceptive manipulations; and
- (ii) enable the public to validate the authenticity of original media and non-decentive manipulations to establish digital content provenance; and
- (C) increase the ability of internet companies, journalists, watchdog organizations, other relevant entities, and members of the public to—
- (i) meaningfully scrutinize and identify potential digital content forgeries: and
- (ii) relay trust and information about digital content provenance to content consumers.
- (2) CONTENTS.—The plan required under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
- (A) A Government-wide research and development agenda to-
- (i) improve technologies and systems to detect digital content forgeries: and
- (ii) relay information about digital content provenance to content consumers.
- (B) An assessment of the feasibility of, and obstacles to, the deployment of technologies and systems to capture, preserve, and display digital content provenance.
- (C) An assessment of the feasibility of, and challenges in, distinguishing between-
- (i) benign or helpful alterations to digital content; and
- (ii) intentionally deceptive or obfuscating alterations to digital content.
- (D) A discussion of best practices, including any necessary standards, for the adoption and effective use of technologies and systems to determine digital content provenance and detect digital content forgeries.
- (E) Conceptual proposals for necessary research projects and experiments to further develop successful technology to ascertain digital content provenance.
- (F) Proposed policy changes, including changes in law, to-
- (i) incentivize the adoption of technologies, systems, open standards, or other means to detect digital content forgeries and determine digital content provenance; and
- (ii) reduce the incidence, proliferation, and impact of digital content forgeries.
- (G) Recommendations for models for public-private partnerships to fight disinformation and reduce digital content forgeries, including partnerships that support and collaborate on-
- (i) industry practices and standards for determining digital content provenance;
- (ii) digital literacy education campaigns and user-friendly detection tools for the public to reduce the proliferation and impact of disinformation and digital content forgeries;
- (iii) industry practices and standards for documenting relevant research and progress in machine learning and related areas; and
- (iv) the means and methods for identifying and addressing the technical and financial infrastructure that supports the proliferation of digital content forgeries, such as inauthentic social media accounts and bank accounts.
- (H) An assessment of privacy and civil liberties requirements associated with efforts

- to deploy technologies and systems to determine digital content provenance or reduce the proliferation of digital content forgeries, including statutory or other proposed policy changes.
- (I) A determination of metrics to define the success of-
- (i) technologies or systems to detect digital content forgeries;
- (ii) technologies or systems to determine digital content provenance; and
- (iii) other efforts to reduce the incidence, proliferation, and impact of digital content forgeries.
- (d) Consultations.—In carrying out subsection (c), the Task Force shall consult with the following:
- (1) The Director of the National Science Foundation.
- (2) The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
- (3) The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- (4) The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
- (5) The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- (6) The Secretary of Energy.
- (7) The Secretary of Defense.
- (8) The Attorney General.
- (9) The Secretary of State.
- (10) The Federal Trade Commission.
- (11) The United States Trade Representative.
- (12) Representatives from private industry and nonprofit organizations.
- (13) Representatives from institutions of higher education.
- (14) Such other individuals as the Task Force considers appropriate.
- (e) STAFF -
- (1) IN GENERAL.—Staff of the Task Force shall be comprised of detailees with expertise in artificial intelligence or related fields from-
- (A) the Department of Homeland Security: (B) the National Institute of Standards and
- Technology; or (C) any other Federal agency the co-chairpersons of the Task Force consider appropriate with the consent of the head of the Federal agency.
 - (2) OTHER ASSISTANCE.-
- (A) IN GENERAL.—The co-chairpersons of the Task Force may enter into an agreement with an eligible entity for the temporary assignment of employees of the eligible entity to the Task Force in accordance with this paragraph.
- (B) APPLICATION OF ETHICS RULES.—An employee of an eligible entity assigned to the Task Force under subparagraph (A)-
- (i) shall be considered a special Government employee for the purpose of Federal law, including—
- (I) chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code; and
- (II) the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); and
- (ii) notwithstanding section 202(a) of title 18. United States Code, may be assigned to the Task Force for a period of not more than 2 years.
- (C) FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—An agreement entered into with an eligible entity under subparagraph (A) shall require the eligible entity to be responsible for any costs associated with the assignment of an employee to the Task Force.
- (D) TERMINATION.—The co-chairpersons of the Task Force may terminate the assignment of an employee to the Task Force under subparagraph (A) at any time and for any reason.
 - (f) TASK FORCE REPORTS.—
 - (1) INTERIM REPORT.—

- (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which all of the appointments have been made under subsection (b)(2)(C), the Task Force shall submit to the President and the relevant congressional committees the coordinated plan developed under subsection (c)(1) in the form of an interim report containing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Task Force.
- (B) CONTENTS.—The report required under subparagraph (A) shall include specific recommendations for ways to reduce the proliferation and impact of digital content forgeries, including the deployment of technologies and systems to determine digital content provenance.
- (2) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the submission of the interim report under paragraph (1)(A), the Task Force shall submit to the President and the relevant congressional committees the coordinated plan developed under subsection (c)(1) in the form of a final report containing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Task Force.
- (3) REQUIREMENTS.—With respect to each report submitted under this subsection-
- (A) the Task Force shall make the report publicly available; and
 - (B) the report-
- (i) shall be produced in an unclassified form: and
 - (ii) may include a classified annex.
- (g) TERMINATION.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall terminate on the date that is 90 days after the date on which the Task Force submits the final report under subsection (f)(2).
- (2) Records.—Upon the termination of the Task Force under paragraph (1), each record of the Task Force shall become a record of the National Archives and Records Adminis-
- SA 4372. Mr. PORTMAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
- At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. . CRITICAL DOMAIN RESEARCH AND DE-VELOPMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle H of title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

"SEC. 890B. HOMELAND SECURITY CRITICAL DO-MAIN RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-MENT.

- "(a) IN GENERAL.-
- "(1) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—The Secretary is authorized to conduct research and development to-
- "(A) identify United States critical domains for economic security and homeland security: and
- "(B) evaluate the extent to which disruption, corruption, exploitation, or dysfunction of any of such domain poses a substantial threat to homeland security.
 - "(2) Requirements.-
- "(A) RISK ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL DOMAINS.— The research under paragraph (1) shall include a risk analysis of each identified United States critical domain for economic security to determine the degree to which

there exists a present or future threat to homeland security in the event of disruption, corruption, exploitation, or dysfunction to such domain. Such research shall consider, to the extent possible, the following:

"(i) The vulnerability and resilience of relevant supply chains.

"(ii) Foreign production, processing, and manufacturing methods.

"(iii) Influence of malign economic actors. "(iv) Asset ownership.

"(v) Relationships within the supply

chains of such domains. "(vi) The degree to which the conditions

referred to in clauses (i) through (v) would place such a domain at risk of disruption, corruption, exploitation, or dysfunction.

"(B) ADDITIONAL RESEARCH INTO HIGH-RISK CRITICAL DOMAINS .- Based on the identification and risk analysis of United States critical domains for economic security pursuant to paragraph (1) and subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, respectively, the Secretary may conduct additional research into those critical domains, or specific elements thereof, with respect to which there exists the highest degree of a present or future threat to homeland security in the event of disruption, corruption, exploitation, or dysfunction to such a domain. For each such high-risk domain, or element thereof, such research shall—

"(i) describe the underlying infrastructure and processes;

"(ii) analyze present and projected performance of industries that comprise or support such domain;

"(iii) examine the extent to which the supply chain of a product or service necessary to such domain is concentrated, either through a small number of sources, or if multiple sources are concentrated in one geographic

"(iv) examine the extent to which the demand for supplies of goods and services of such industries can be fulfilled by present and projected performance of other industries, identify strategies, plans, and potential barriers to expand the supplier industrial base, and identify the barriers to the participation of such other industries;

'(v) consider each such domain's performance capacities in stable economic environments, adversarial supply conditions, and under crisis economic constraints;

"(vi) identify and define needs and requirements to establish supply resiliency within each such domain; and

'(vii) consider the effects of sector consolidation, including foreign consolidation, either through mergers or acquisitions, or due to recent geographic realignment, on such industries' performances.

"(3) Consultation.—In conducting the research under paragraphs (1) and (2)(B), the Secretary shall consult with appropriate Federal agencies, including the Bureau of Industry and Security at the Department of Commerce, State agencies, and private sector stakeholders.

"(4) PUBLICATION.—Beginning 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall publish a report containing information relating to the research under paragraphs (1) and (2)(B), including findings, evidence, analysis, and recommendations. Such report shall be updated annually through 2026.

(b) Surmission to Congress—Not later than 90 days after the publication of each report required under subsection (a)(4), the Secretary shall transmit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate each such report, together with a description of actions the Secretary, in consultation with appropriate Federal agencies,

will undertake or has undertaken in response to each such report.
"(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

"(1) ECONOMIC SECURITY.—The term 'economic security' means the condition of having secure and resilient domestic production capacity, combined with reliable access to the global resources necessary to maintain an acceptable standard of living and to protect core national values.

"(2) UNITED STATES CRITICAL DOMAINS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY.—The term 'United States critical domains for economic security' means the critical infrastructure and other associated industries, technologies, and intellectual property, or any combination thereof, that are essential to the economic security of the United States.

"(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— There is authorized to be appropriated \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through

2026 to carry out this section.".
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 116 Stat. 2135) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 890A the following new item:

"Sec. 890B. Homeland security critical domain research and development."

SA 4373. Mr. REED (for himself and Mr. Whitehouse) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes: which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. . ADDITION OF RHODE ISLAND TO THE MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MANAGE-MENT COUNCIL.

Section 302(a)(1)(B) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1852(a)(1)(B)) is amended-

(1) by inserting "Rhode Island," "States of";

(2) by inserting "Rhode Island," after "ex-

cept North Carolina,";
(3) by striking "21" and inserting "23"; and
(4) by striking "13" and inserting "14".

SA 4374. Mr. REED submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was

ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following:

EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR ADJUST-SEC. MENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN LIBERIAN NATIONALS.

Section 7611(b)(1)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (8 U.S.C. 1255 note) is amended by striking "2 years" and inserting "3 years".

SA 4375. Mr. MERKLEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1253. REPEAL OF SUNSET ON PROHIBITION ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT OF CER-TAIN COVERED MUNITIONS ITEMS TO HONG KONG POLICE FORCE.

The Act entitled "An Act to prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions and crime control items to the Hong Kong Police Force", approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116-77; 133 Stat. 1173), as amended by section 1252 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283), is further amended by striking section 3.

SA 4376. Mr. MERKLEY (for himself and Mr. Rubio) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1253. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND AC-TION GROUP.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) QUALIFIED RESEARCH ENTITY.—The term "qualified research entity" means an entity that-

(A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a federally funded research and development center:

(B) has appropriate expertise and analytical capability to write the report required under subsection (c); and

(C) is free from any financial, commercial. or other entanglements, which could undermine the independence of such report or create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, with-

(i) the Government of the People's Republic of China:

(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;

(iii) any company incorporated in the People's Republic of China or a subsidiary of any such company; or

(iv) any company or entity incorporated outside of the People's Republic of China that is believed to have a substantial financial or commercial interest in the People's Republic of China.

(2) United States Person.—The term "United States person" means-

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(b) CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.